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COST STUDIES UNDERTAKEN BY
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT1
FoR many years various agencies of the federal government
have engaged in the preparation of studies which now consti-
tute a large warehouse of information on costs. Unfortunately
only part of the material is available in published form; a tre-
mendous amount of data has not been made public at all. The
present summary is designed to show the general characteristics
of such cost analysis, rather than to describe published material.
Although the earliest cost survey reported dates back to
1900, a large proportion of the studies were not undertaken
until 1929.Theapproximate timing of the studies is shown
by the following summary estimates of their number. The
number of items was developed by counting each commodity
or service and each year covered as a separate study. Thus, a
study which covered hides and shoes in three separate years








Cost surveys have been made by such a variety of agencies,
for so many purposes, and following so many different meth-
ods, that proper use of their results requires an analysis of the
1 appendix is the outgrowth of a study undertaken by Mr. Mark
Massel for the Bureau of Research and Statistics of the Office of Pro-
duction Management. The basis of this report is an inventory of the cost
studies of the federal agencies. The views expressed herein do not neces-
sarily reflect the opinions of the Office of Production Management.
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surveys themselves. For example, a study of weighted averages
of total costs would not, in all probability, reflect the propor-
tion of total costs represented by labor because a substantial
amount of wages is included in overhead. The results of the
same survey might require recasting to be useful in developing
a cost formula for a government contract because it included
collection expenses, which are not incurred in such contracts,
in administrative costs. In like fashion, studies of national
weighted average costs are unsatisfactory if costs reflecting
regional or quality differences are desired, or if marginal, in-
cremental, or bulk-line costs are needed. The following sec-
dons are illustrative of the limitations, methods, and scope of
cost studies as revealed by the recent survey.
Purposes of Surveys
Federal agencies have developed cost information to fill sev-
eral needs: as parts of general economic inquiries into par-
ticular industries; as aids to procurement functions; as by-
products of the agencies' own operation for administrative and
budgetary analysis; and as elements in regulatory functions.
Some agencies have conducted surveys for a number of such
purposes. For example, the Federal Trade Commission has de-
veloped costs to support economic studies, and to reinforce
its regulations of monopolistic influences and restraints of
trade; the Tariff Commission has conducted studies of costs to
supplement economic analysis, and to make cost comparisons
for tariff adjustments.
General inquiries have served a variety of functions. Cost
studies have been developed to supplement economic analyses
of prices, industrial structures and production practices by
such agencies as the Agricultural Adjustment Administration,
the Alcohol Administration, and the Federal Trade Com-
mission.
Some agencies, such as the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic
Commerce, have related surveys to a program of educating
business buyers and sellers on the general ranges of costs and on
problems of cost finding. In this type of activity, as in the
development of unit construction costs which the Tennessee
Valley Authority publishes, statistical averages or norms areFEDERAL COST STUDIES 293
set up to serve individual organizations as benchmarks for
managerial measurements of efficiency.
The use of costs in government purchasing has been related
largely, but not exclusively, to defense procurement. During
the last war Federal Trade Commission cost surveys were
utilized to help determine whether prices suggested for nego-
tiated contracts were reasonable, and to set the final prices
under some cost-plus contracts. Today cost information devel-
oped over a period of time serves the Maritime Commission
in its formulation of shipbuilding contracts. One agency, the
Tennessee Valley Authority, uses information on cement costs
to adjust contract prices as a regular peacetime procurement
practice.
The Forest Service makes cost studies as part of its selling
policy. Determinations of fair selling prices for the standing
timber in the National Forests are based largely on analyses of
logging and milling costs.
A wealth of information, especially in the field of construc-
tion costs, has been developed as a by-product of the regular
operations of several agencies. The Public Works Administra-
tion, the Rural Electrification Administration, the Bureau of
Indian Affairs, and the Bureau of Reclamation analyze certain
elements of operations on individual projects through cost
data. A few agencies develop similar internal analyses for vari-
ous services such as motor vehicle, building, central filing, and
telephone switchboard operations.
The utilization of cost information in the development of
regulatory functions has usually been focused on problems of
price regulation for commodities and public utility services.
Thus, the Tariff Commission has to compare the cost of pro-
duction of domestic commodities with those of competitive
foreign items as set down in a specific market. The Bituminous
Coal Division must determine weighted average costs by dis-
tricts and marketing areas so that these costs may serve as
bases for setting minimum prices for bituminous coal. The
Federal Trade Commission, in its "Robinson-Patman" investi-
gations, examines differences among individual enterprises with
regard to cost of manufacture, sale and delivery.
In the public utility field, costs have been studied as an aid
in checking valuations of fixed property and prices paid for294 APPENDIX A
equipment, and in analyzing the costs of the services them-
selves. For example, the Interstate Commerce Commission
maintains a continuing program for the study of trends in
construction costs to support its general valuation studies,
while the Federal Power Commission has pursued construction
cost studies in the power field. The Federal Communications
Commission developed an intensive study of the manufacturing
costs of communications equipment as a check on transactions
between affiliated communications and equipment companies.
In the service field, the Interstate Commerce Commission has
investigated costs under various alternative methods of trans-
portation for rate making purposes, and the Maritime Com-
mission has conducted a continuing program of analysis of
costs of ship operations under its contracts.
Cost information has been utilized in some fields of regula-
tion where cost-price relationships are used only as evidence
of underlying conditions. Thus in several antitrust cases the
Department of Justice applied cost and financial data in de-
veloping evidence of monopolistic conditions. The unjust en-
richment taxes necessitated cost and financial analyses in the
Bureau of Internal Revenue. It might be noted, parenthetically,
that in most problems of regulation and revenue the conven-
tional focus is on the costs of the individual enterprise; while
in some, such as the determinations of tariffs and minimum
bituminous coal prices, statistical summations of industries are
utilized.
Forms of Data
The forms in which cost data are cast are too varied for a
complete listing. In many instances, the agency is able to
change the classifications of the final or published data by
retabulating the original returns or by recapitulating sub-totals;
in others, the present forms cannot be changed. There is no
necessary consistency in the forms of the data for the surveys
of the individual agencies.
Probably the most frequent method of averaging costs is
the development of a weighted average of total costs for an
entire industry. In some cases, ranges in costs are available;
in many, frequency distributions may be worked out; in a
few, estimates of "normal" costs can be made.
Most cost breakdowns follow functional lines: manufactur-FEDERAL COST STUDIES 295
ing, selling and administration. Within these functions, the
types cf expenses may be broken down into labor, materials
and overhead. It is unusual, however, to find such breakdowns
under administrative and selling expense. Some surveys pro-
duce much finer detail by showing costs of the various labor
operations or by dividing overhead into superintendence,
power, depreciation, small tools, supplies, etc. These break-
downs are usually given in dollar figures, but some tabulations
show them only as percentages of total cost or of sales.
The functional breakdowns of manufacturing, selling and
administrative costs have been disregarded in those surveys
which have confined classification to types of expenses such
as labor, materials and overhead. However, such groupings
may differ from one survey to another. Thus, indirect labor
may be included either in overhead or in total labor costs.
A few surveys are confined to one or two elements of cost,
for example, labor costs or taxes.
Transportation is included in surveys of total delivered
costs, but is accounted for only partially in those which derive
f.o.b. factory costs. Further, studies of delivered costs may be
restricted to one producing region, may concentrate on one
marketing region, may include transportation costs in national
averages, or may reflect them in regional averages.
The problem of estimating costs by stages of manufacture
or for separate processes assumes significant proportions on
many occasions. Some studies carry cumulative costs through
specific stages, paying little or no attention to changes in
ownership, and simply adding up the costs of the separate
processes; others utilize the prices charged by the raw ma-
terials producer rather than his costs. Thus the costs of canned
vegetables may be derived by adding to canning costs either
the farmers' costs of growing the vegetables or the prices
the canners pay for the vegetables.
Relating costs to specific products and sizes is another tech-
nique which has been developed in varying degree. Cost figures
have been derived for differences in the qualities of certain
commodities, such as the various grades of gasoline. Some sur-
veys have covered specific articles with detailed specifications;
others have covered average costs for the whole range of quali-
ties of a specific item; a few have been set up to develop aver-
ages for large industrial groups such as nonferrous mining.296 APPENDIX A
In most surveys of packaged products, average costs cover-
ing all sizes are usually presented. However, in some cases,
cost differentials have been developed for different sizes of
containers, for example, No. 2andNo. 10cansof vegetables.
Types of Authorization
Another element influencing the cost data is the type of au-
thorization under which the survey is made. The instrument
of authorization may consist of legislation, court decisions,
Congressional resolutions asking for inquiries, directives from
the President, requests from other agencies, or a combination
of these demands. Unfortunately the effect of the authoriza-
tion is not always clear. Moreover itis not practicable to
classify them because of the variety of components: even the
authority given the individual agency may undergo changes
through time; and some agencies prosecute surveys under
several authorizations during a single period.
Many authorizations contain only general reference to costs;
some include no mention of cost; others list specific inclusions
or exclusions. In a few acts, Congress has stated which types
of cost shall be considered and how they shall be valued. For
example, the Bituminous Coal Act provides for weighted aver-
age costs, including the depletion and depreciation charges
used for purposes of determining income taxes. However, most
agencies are free to decide how costs shall be estimated and
how surveys shall be conducted, subject only to the review of
the courts. Thus the Federal Trade Commission, except for
its work on Robinson-Patman cases, determines the types of
cost to be included and the bases for valuation. The Depart-
ment of Justice, in utilizing costs in connection with antitrust
cases, follows general rules of evidence in presenting such
information, with no limitations on its treatment of costs other
than the reactions of courts and juries.
General authority to conduct surveys is the basis for certain
cost projects of several agencies such as the Federal Trade
Commission, the Agricultural Adjustment Administration and
the Commodity Exchange Administration. The cost technique
employed in such projects depends on• the purpose at hand.
For example, a study dealing with labor costs might segregate
all labor costs from other elements, lumping direct and indirectFEDERAL COST STUDIES 297
labor together; while a Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Com-
merce survey of distribution costs would focus on the purchas-
ing, storing, selling and delivering functions of the distributor,
including labor as an element in each function.
The franchise for undertaking the cost projects of some
agencies is implicit in the general authority to carry on non-
regulatory functions. Thus cost information has been devel-
oped as a phase of administrative control over construction
projects by the Public Works Administration, the Tennessee
Valley Authority, the Bureau of Reclamation, the Rural Elec-
trification Administration and the Soil Conservation Service.
Another aspect of authorization, with special bearing on the
ability to secure information, is the power of an agency to
compel disclosure of internal information or its ability to de-
velop voluntary cooperation. Although private companies have
supplied cost data freely in the case of most surveys, the
authority of an agency to utilize the power of subpoena may
on occasion have been very helpful.
Methods of Conducting Surveys
The composition of cost data is strongly affected by the
methods followed in the underlying surveys. Control over the
process of defining and estimating costs can be greatest when
cost data are developed through an agency's own books, as
in the cases of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the Bureau of
Reclamation, the Tennessee Valley Authority and the Public
Works Administration. Similarly, control may be exercised
to a considerable degree through field audits of the books of
individual enterprises, as in certain surveys of the Agricultural
Marketing Service, the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, the
Tariff Commission and the Federal Trade Commission.
There is somewhat less opportunity to control cost methods
when a study is based on mail questionnaires, and for this
reason attempts have been made to provide safeguards. Mail
surveys have been implemented at times with uniform direc-
tions for execution of the questionnaire. Some agencies, such
as the Federal Trade Commission, have utilized spot audits
to check the reliability of investigated items which differed
widely from general averages; others have simply tabulated
the mail returns.298 APPENDIX A
During the first World War, the Federal Trade Commission
occasionally employed private accounting firms to determine
company costs through field audits. No other instance of such
a procedure has come to light, since there has been no sub-
sequent staff shortage comparable with that period.
Because of legal requirements, such agencies as the Tariff
Commission and the Bituminous Coal Division hold formal
hearings to permit interested parties to comment on previously
released tentative findings of fact or to furnish new cost in-
formation. Such hearings may provide new data or additional
checks on the material developed by the agency.
Representativeness of Sample
In gauging how reasonable it would be to apply the results
of a survey, the representativeness of the sample covered may
bear great weight. There are wide variations in sampling prac-
tice. In the case of some surveys, notably those of the Bitu-
minous Coal Division, substantially the entire industry is cov-
ered. At the other extreme are studies devoted to one company,
sometimes during one brief period, sometimes over a series of
years. In the prosecution of cases, the Department of Justice
and Federal Trade Commission usually devote their analyses
to one company. The Tariff Commission, in studying cost
trends for its own analyses, may confine its data to one or a
few representative companies, although it does not follow this
procedure in its formal investigations. The Bureau of Mines
has published many engineering cost studies of individual
operations for comparative purposes.
Representativeness may be defined in terms of industrial
coverage, geographical scope, types of operations, or types of
qualities. The Tariff Commission's determinaton of repre-
sentative costs is based upon the need to compare costs of
competing foreign and domestic products. Thus a domestic
product which has not been in competition with a foreign
product for reasons of physical characteristics, region of origin
or point of sale, would not be included in a representative
sample. The problem of sampling is complicated further by the
fact that one survey may cover companies which are repre-
sentative of a particular producing region but not of the entire
country; another survey may have covered companies whichFEDERAL COST STUDIES 299
are fairly satisfactory samples of the entire country although
the companies included in any one region may not be repre-
sentative of that area.
Definition of Cost
There is wide variety in attitude and practice regarding
what ought to be included in cost and how the various ele-
ments should be estimated. Some surveys have been affected
largely by the individual businessman's opinions as to the
proper components of cost. Under such conditions audits be-
come mere checks on accuracy. Other surveys have been
based on rules setting forth acceptable elements and methods
of valuation. The manual Uniform Contracts and Cost Ac-
counting Definitions was developed by an interdepartmental
conference of the Federal Trade Commission, the Departments
of War, and Commerce, and the Council of National
Defense, for use during the last war. It should be noted, how-
ever, that the development of cost regulations has not been as
extensive as the regulation of financial reports.
On occasion, rulings providing fairly close control over
cost definitions may have been worked out for field studies
that remain unpublished. Since many such instructions are
formulated verbally or through the unwritten rules of prac-
tice of an agency, it is often quite difficult for the outside
student to evaluate a survey properly.
The methods of investigation followed must be considered
carefully if one intends to compare cost data pertaining to
different periods and prepared by different agencies. For ex-
ample, a number of cost surveys made in the bituminous coal
industry have utilized -such varying methods of information
collection, classification, and valuation that comparative cost
analyses of the data are subject to many qualifications. Cost
surveys were made by the Federal Trade Commission for
1916—18 (a survey in 1920 was stopped by an injunction); by
the United States Coal Commission for 192 1—22; by the Na-
tional Recovery Administration under the Bituminous Coal
Code for November i933 to January 1935(witha special labor
cost study in May 1933); and a continuing survey has been
conducted by the National Bituminous Coal Commission and
by the Bituminous Coal Division of the Department of the300 APPENDIX A
Interior from 1936 to the present time. It should be noted,
parenthetically, that some of this material was not tabulated
and that all the tables were not published.
Examination of the pertinent forms, and of the data re-
leased through these studies, brings to light significant varia-
tion in the ways in which costs were classified and combined.
It is not clear, for example, that each agency obtained total
costs for mine labor. The same type of labor was classed as
"Mine Supervisory" in some surveys and as "Administrative
Expense" in others. In some, mine office expense was included
in fixed charges and general expense, and in others it was
shown separately. Some surveys included selling with total
costs while others eliminated such costs; one included as a
selling cost discounts allowed to wholesalers, i.e., the differ-
ence between the prices to retailers and to wholesalers.
In. one survey, operator's statements were accepted at face
value; in two others, they were corrected for items which
seemed out of line with the general averages; in another, there
were revisions based upon the judgment of the agency's staff.
Differences in treatment are most apparent in the charges for
depreciation and depletion; the Federal Trade Commission
corrected such items on the basis of its own analysis; the U. S.
Coal Commission accepted the operator's charges if they were
based on the Bureau of Internal Revenue's valuations; while
the National Recovery Administration, the National Bitu-
minous Coal Commission and the Bituminous Coal Division of
the Department of the Interior accepted the depreciation and
depletion allowances permitted for income tax purposes, the
latter two under Congressional mandate.
Conclusion
The body of cost information in the various agencies has
considerable potential usefulness. It can be employed to make
direct estimates for price analyses of certain products; it can
be made an integral part of economic analyses; it can help to
determine which are the danger points in setting up cost or
escalator provisions for negotiated contracts; it shows promise
of use in labor mediation, as a source of information on what
wages an industry can afford to pay and what would be the
effects of changes in labor conditions on costs; it offers aid inFEDERAL COST STUDIES 301
formulating, designing, and administering new cost surveys;
it provides benchmarks of costs for use in promoting effective
management.
The application of this information, however, is neither fool-
proof nor simple. To obtain the full benefits of any survey one
must make a comparative analysis of its background and deter-
mine the needs to be met. Some results may be used directly,
some may be useful with modification, others may be value-
less. Although much of the useful source material is not gen-
erally available at the present time, a considerable body of
valuable information can be found in the published material.
Utilization of the confidential data is, of course, confined to
the federal agencies.APPENDIX B




COST ACCOUNTING AND PRICE
DETERMINATION IN THE
SOVIET UNION2
LENIN'S famous slogan, "accounting and control are the chief
things necessary for the smooth and correct functioning of
the first phase of the communist society,"has wide currency
among Soviet economists, and the better part of their thinking
is devoted to problems of cost accounting and price policy.
Without formulating them in terms of modern theory (or
connecting their practices with the theoretical work done else-
where), they conceive of these questions in a manner deter-
mined by the peculiar concept of economics which their litera-
ture has made familiar.4 Unfortunately, a reliable judgment as
to the efficiency of the Russian accounting system is rendered
almost impossible by the frequent occurrence of "bottlenecks"
which may be attributable as much to disproportions between
'This appendix is a segment of a larger study of the problems of eco-
nomic planning in Soviet Russia by Paul A. Baran. In the large study, Mr.
Baran attempts to show that deliberate socialist planning begins in Russia
with the first Five Year Plan. The earlier period of War Communism
was characterized by a system of emergency war regulations compli-
cated by the political necessities of revolutionary action.
2 The author would like to express his great indebtedness to Professor
Edward S. Mason for his encouragement and suggestions in connection
with this study. Dr. Abram Bergson and Dr. P. M. Sweezy made valuable
criticisms which are gratefully acknowledged.
3 and Revolution (Vanguard Press, 1927), p. 204.
"We do not have here a free play of prices as is usual in capitalist
countries. SAle fix the prices of bread first of all. We fix the price of
the industrial products. We are promoting a policy of lowering the
costs of production of industrial output, endeavoring at the same time
to keep stable the price of agricultural commodities. Is it not clear that
such a particular and specific order does not exist on the market of the
capitalist countries?" Joseph Stalin, Voprosy Leninisina (Problems of
Leninism, i ith ed., Moscow, 1939), p. 235. (This and other passages from
Russian books and periodicals are translated by the author.)
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ambitious governmental aims and real possibilities as to errone-
ous calculations and false economic decisions. It is obvious, for
instance, that the famine in the year 1932—33hadnothing to do
with good or bad price fixing, or with correct or artificial
accounting. It was caused by a political action of the govern-
ment, which underestimated the peasants' power of resistance
(slaughtering of cattle, etc.) and disregarded the short run
economic consequences of its precipitous political action. On
the other hand, clear cases of calamities which occurred only
because of errors in establishing price relationships are just as
customary.ö Certain features of Soviet price and cost calcula-
tions can, however, be distinguished; they are then seen to
represent a peculiar mixture of different methods, resulting in
part from the tremendous strain under which the whole sys-
tem works, in part also from rather dogmatic theoretical
techniques.
2
Generallyspeaking, the Russian planning system is based on
a set of fundamental decisions, according to which the produc-
tion and allocation of goods and services are directed with-
out regard to their monetary valuation.6 The social product
of a year, consisting of a certain quantity of various commodi-
the XVIIIth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union, V. M. Molotov reported: "In the year 1935theGovernment had
only to follow the suggestion of Comrade Stalin and to establish bonuses
for delivery of cotton and tremendous successes were achieved in a
very short time." (The Third Five Year Plan, Report to the XVIHth
Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, p. 26).Again,
Trade Commissar A. Mikoyan remarked: "We had a muddle in the prices
of textiles. The result was that the industry made surplus profits on
some lines of output and incurred heavy losses on others. Our business
managers were anxious to produce more than the planned quantity of
the profitable goods and not to produce at all the commodities whose
production caused them a loss. These 'loss lines' are, however, just as
important for us as the 'profit lines.' Now all that has been corrected!"
Ibid., p. 24.
8 "Accountingin money terms carried through the medium of prices
does not suffice in a socialist economy. Accounting in terms of quan-
tities and qualities of products of labor (per piece, per weight unit, etc.)
and in terms of labor hours is just as necessary. Without this latter
type of accounting it is impossible to safeguard the right proportions
in the development of the material production of the socialist society.
If the accounting in kind in capitalist countries has only a statisticalSOVIET COST ACCOUNTING 307
ties, is distributed by the authority among competing uses.
After the desired capital investment has been determined and
the expected quantity of consumer goods estimated, the pros-
pective amount of money income to be paid out is computed.
By deducting therefrom the envisaged proceeds of direct taxa-
tion and governmental borrowing, a figure is obtained which
indicates the magnitude of the purchasing power remaining at
the disposal of the population. For this purchasing power to be
absorbed, the prices of goods and services offered to the con-
sumer have to be fixed in such a way as to render their aggre-
gate money value exactly equal to the amount distributed as
income by the different governmental agencies. Since the gen-
eral standard of living is extremely low, the resources allotted
to the output of consumer goods are severely limited, and the
list of these goods is accordingly short; thus the "freedom of
choice" left to the population is almost illusory. While formally
enjoying the right to select and to substitute, the population
in fact has the alternatives of acquiring whatever goods are
available or foregoing the satisfaction of its most fundamental
needs. If these collections of goods were produced in planned
quantities and qualities, the consumer—though obtaining less
"ophelimity" (but perhaps more "utility") as compared with
the state of affairs in which he could choose fully among
various ways of spending his income—would still be able to
transform his money income into somegoodsand services.
Such an "ideal" situation has never been approached in fact.
Even in the best periods since 1928—29(thebeginning of the
first Five Year Plan) there has never been a time when ordinary
consumers could spend their entire income on the limited list
of commodities offered by the government stores.7 Formal prob-
importance and some interest from the viewpoint of business cycle
research, in the socialist society it is of paramount practical significance.
The money income of the population being fixed, the prices fixed
by the government determine the partition of the social product into
a fund of consumption and a fund of accumulation." S. Atlas in Pro b-
lemy Econorniki, No.1939.
Hencethe frequent appearance of large amounts of "floating" pur-
chasing power which in the legal channels meet no regular supply and
thus drive the prices on the "underground markets" up to fantastic
levels. (See the dispatches of Mr. G. E. R. Gedye in the New York
Times, September ii -22, 1940.) A simple "quantity equation" explains
these inflationary phenomena.308 APPENDIX B
lems are not separable from the material contents of planning.
Where guns or machines are more important than butter, there
is little butter. Freedom of choice, maintained by the distribu-
tion of "general purchasing power" which can be used accord-
ing to individual tastes, has meant privation at a time when
bare necessities have been unobtainable. To limit this "freedom"
by offering only a certain number of commodities, but in suffi-
cient quantities and qualities, may provide a more or less com-
plete satisfaction of wants. Inasmuch as the part of the social
product devoted to "Sphere A" (as the Russians call the in-
vestment goods industries, armament industries, etc.) was ex-
tended to the limit, while the quantities assigned to consump-
tion (Sphere B) were confined to existence minima, difficulties
would have arisen even if the planning mechanism had worked
with the highest precision. Disasters like bad harvests and
failures by some economic units to live up to their estimates
would create gaps on the supply side that would upset all "pro-
portions" even if these proportions had been calculated as care-
fully as possible. These gaps—which in a community working
not for guns but for butter, or endowed with rich reserves
from previous years, could easily be filled with the help of
emergency stores accumulated for such purposes 8—necessarily
lead in Russia to shortages and "bottlenecks" which disrupt
the planned exchange of income and commodities.
A correct solution of the pricing problem could create a
system of relative prices which would direct the resources as-
signed to the satisfaction of consumer needs into their most
effective employment. The quantity of these resources, how-
ever, and the extent to which the shortage of all consumer
goods is permitted to prevail, depend on the preference scale
of the authority, on the country's natural resources, and on
the productivity of its labor. As long as the first condition per-
sists as it has, and the last two factors are underdeveloped, the
only function left to an adequate price and cost accounting
8This explains in part the comparative ease with which the German
planners achieved their goal of rearmament. The Hitler government
began work on the basis of large unused capacities, of idle reserves of
qualified workers, and was able to take over an established economic
system. The cooperation of all the economically dominant strata of the
German population, aid from abroad, and the continuity of business
management are other factors which also facilitated the huge investment
of resources in armament industries.SOVIET COST ACCOUNTING 309
system is to maximize the results of the economic activity
on the basis of the fundamental decisions and conditions as
given. It is difficult, therefore, to agree with A. P. Lerner9
when he insists that the planning authority should confine itself
to the enforcement of the basic principle .that "price must be
made equal to marginal cost." Such a policy would be appro-
priate only if the planning authority believed that its function
should "wither away," and intended to leave the allocation
of the nation's resources to the choice of the consumers. De-
sirable as it may appear, there is no reason to regard such a
policy as a sine qua non. 'While it is true that consumer. goods,
once their aggregate quantity has been established, should be
priced according to this principle in order to maximize the
satisfaction derived from them, the decision about this aggre-
gate quantity itself (or in other words, about the rate of ac-
cumulation which is desired) would have to remain at the
discretion of the planning authority. The time preference of
the community as a whole may be different from the time
preference of its individual members; the government may re-
fuse to rely upon voluntary savings attracted by a high interest
rate (as proposed by Enrico Barone); or it may wish to make
extra profits on some commodities (with a view to curtailing
their consumption) and to incur losses on others (with the in-
tention of sponsoring their consumption). Such decisions are
to be expected if planning involves a certain definite economic
policy, be it rearmament, industrialization, or some other
change in the economic structure of the country. To deprive
the planning authority of the right to pursue such a policy, to
limit its function merely to the execution of consumers' ballots,
would reduce to absurdity the whole idea of a centralized
direction of economic affairs. Moreover, this centralized direc-
tion may possibly (but not necessarily) represent the more
"rational" set of preferences, measured in terms of maximum
welfare, as compared with the outcome of consumers' choices
which could be (and are) governed by very doubtful "tastes."°
9 Economic Journal, p. 270.
'°See R. F. Kahn, "Some Notes on Ideal Output," Economic Journal,
Vol.(March '935), pp. 1-3g. Of course, it is an entirely different
problem to determine what represents the optimum method of reaching
the aims of state economic policy. It is quite possible that selling at
marginal costs combined with strong propaganda campaigns designed to
influence existing demand and to create new demand, with administra-310 APPENDIX B
But even though selling prices, which represent govern-
mental decision as to distribution of wealth and employment
of resources, need not necessarily be identical or even pro-
portionate to costs, the proper calculation of these costs is
imperative. Only by carrying through this calculation can the
planning authority obtain indispensable information as to how
much every economic decision means in terms of alternative
choices. Thus the Russians appear to be on the right track, in
principle, in treating their prices as a sum of different elements.
"The final retail price is composed of (i)thecosts of produc-
tion, (2)generaloncosts of administration, wholesale distribu-
tion, etc., profitof the enterprise, turnovertax (sales
tax), retailexpenses which again may be split into oncosts
of doing business and profits."Allthese items may be classi-
fied for our purposes into two main categories: costs within
the broad meaning of the term, on the one hand, and contribu-
tions toward accumulation of capital, on the other. "The prices
fixed by the Government and the extent of their deviation
from costs thus depend on concrete considerations of economic
policy in every given period," 12andthe magnitude of the
second component of price cannot possibly be treated except
in connection with specific problems. The turnover tax, which
is not uniform for all goods, is varied according to numerous
considerations; 13theprofit rates for different industries also
tive measures forbidding and permitting certain types of consumption,
or with a system of taxation that redistributed the national income,
would lead to the most desirable results. This question cannot, how-
ever, be dealt with theoretically; its answer depends on concrete con-
ditions in different countries. WThcrcas the German authorities even
under the Weimar Republic taxed wages at the source of income and
made the employer responsible for the remittances (because the govern-
ment was not certain of obtaining payment from the wage earner him-
self), the British tax morale permitted full wage disbursement without
endangering fiscal receipts. In a country like Russia, all indirect devices
like taxation, advertising, etc., would ccrtainly prove less efficient from
the viewpoint of the government than a direct policy of price fixing.
11S.Atlas, op. cit., p. 84.
12I.G. Gorelik, Metodika Planirovania Tshornoi Metalurgii (Methods
of Planning in the Metal Industry, Moscow, '937), p. 94.
13Theaggregate amount "syphoned out" by means of direct taxation
and borrowing is very small compared with the total revenue derived
from the turnover tax. The expedient of indirect taxation rather than of
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are fixed with regard to the desirability of their expansion; Ii-
nally retail earnings vary with the character of the store and
with the type of commodity. An investigation of such price fix-
ing practices—very similar, by the way, to the policy in this
field adopted in Germany—would require a broad examination
of the development of different branches of the Russian econ-
omy and could be successfully undertaken only as part of a
general appraisal of the way in which this development is
regulated.
We are not, however, primarily interested in this aspect of
the problem, for government influence upon the final price is
obvious, and the fact that this price is set by fiat is frankly
admitted. Of much greater concern is the far more compli-
cated chain of problems connected with the notion of costs.
3
Thedevices employed in the calculation of costs—though
widely discussed in the literature 14—correspond neither to
the behavior envisaged in the "pure theory of socialist eco-
nomics" nor to the "rational attitude" assumed in "bourgeois"
economics. They resemble rather the practical policy of busi-
nessmen as recently described.'5 This is particularly strange
since the reasons which induce the private entrepreneur to
deviate from the rationale elaborated by theory, and to at-
tempt to maximize his profits and safeguard his investment
according to institutional data and concrete market conditions,
do not apply at all in a planned economy where the state as
monopolist is in possession of the powerful tool of price fixing
and not only could but should (for the sake of its own calcu-
lation) employ the most modern techniques of economic anal-
ysis. But as "bourgeois" economics is mercilessly condemned,
even its formal achievements are widely ignored.
eliminate excess purchasing power mainly for political and psychological
reasons. Moreover, the tlexibility of this tax, which varies from com-
modity to commodity, renders it a powerful tool for adjustment of
prices to unexpected changes in conditions.
14Unfortunatelyaccessible only to a limited extent in this country,
and apparently difficult to discover even in Russia. The most important
work in this field is embodied in governmental instructions and circulars
which are very seldom published.
15See,for example, Hall and Hitch in Oxford Economic Papers, No. 2.312 APPENDIX B
On the other hand certain difficulties which worry the
economist outside the Soviet Union are easily disposed of in
that country. The question of whether to calculate raw mate-
rials, for example, according to their original value (first in,
first out) or their replacement value (last in, first out) is no
problem at all. All raw materials are acquired at a fixed price
and their valuation remains unchanged over an accounting
period.16 Original price and replacement price are equal (at
least during this accounting period, which is long enough for
all practical purposes) no matter what the changes in scarcity
conditions may be.'7 The same applies to all labor and to all
"purchases from other entrepreneurs," which are contracted for
on the basis of fixed prices and therefore cause no cost account-
ing difficulties.
The problems arise exactly as they do in private enterprise.
The proper allowance for depreciation and the task of deter-
mining joint costs are dealt with according to a rule of thumb,
unsatisfactory though it may be.
The ruling formula, applied by practically all enterprises
and enforced by the Soviet authorities, may be briefly ex-
pressed as follows:
(OV—AV+RE) zoo Amortization Rate LT•
where OV =originalvalue, AV =actualvalue, RE =repair
1t3 "Fixed prices of raw materials, semi-finished goods, fuel and power
are established for the enterprise at the beginning of an accounting
period and remain regularly unchanged during the year." D. S. Levin
and M. Polyakov, Kalkulirovanie sebestoirnosti produktsii miasnoi
promyshiennosti (Cost Calculation in the Meat Packing Industry, Mos-
cow-Leningrad, 1926),p.37.
17 In this connection an argument of Professor von Hayek in Eco-
nomica (May 1940), is important. The adjustment of prices over a period
of time is certainly less effective than an instantaneous adjustment.
Professor von Hayek believes that only the market provides such an
immediate reaction of price to changes in conditions. This would be
true, however, only if the market were perfect. The same reasons which
make it impossible for the planning authority to change prices "every
fortnight" seem to inhibit large corporations from altering their price
lists more frequently than is absolutely necessary. Besides, the technical
difficulties which would arise in case of such frequent changes, the
annoyance to the buyers, who would have to change their calculations
unceasingly, seem to make a certain "rigidity" of prices unavoidable
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expenses, LT =lifetimeof the equipment. This formula, how-
ever, involves the difliculty of ascertaining the actual value of
the plant. It was solved in the first years of Russian planning
by periodical (mostly annual) expert appraisal which estab-
lished the actual value as well as the loss in the original value
incurred by operation. It was soon discovered that this proce-
dure, correct as it might appear, involved extremely arbitrary
valuations, estimates and judgments, which not only yielded
unreliable figures, but resulted in considerable red tape, inter-
rupted normal work for the period of revaluation, etc.'8 On
the other hand, it was the only possible way of calculating,
as the plants had not been built or bought by their current
proprietor (the state), but had originated before nationaliza-
tion. Thus their value could not be established except by a new
appraisal which would take account of far-reaching changes in
general conditions.
As soon as new plants built by the planning authority went
into operation, original cost data were readily available. The
appraisal device, repugnant for many reasons, was given up,
and the same formula was applied on a somewhat different
basis. OV —AVcame to be regarded as a fixed magnitude
elaborated by the planning authority.19 According to techno-
logical data (life of the equipment, its productive ability on
the basis of a certain number of work hours) the central board
fixes depreciation quotas which have to be added to the direct
or prime costs, regardless of the real lifetime or the actual pro-
ductivity of the plant in question. This approach, however,
makes the quotas altogether arbitrary. The life of the equip-
merit may be shorter or longer than assumed (depending
heavily, among other things, on the care with which the work-
ers handle it), its technical productivity smaller or greater,
18"Therearc three approaches to the valuation of fixed equipment:
(i)originalvalue, (2)replacementvalue, (3) original value less wear
and tear. As yearly reappraisal of the fixed equipment is very difficult,
and involves great expense in money, time and labor, the plants are
appraised according to their original value, i.e., the value they had when
they began to function." A. Arakelyan in Problemy Economiki, 1938,
No.g.
19"Iri calculating the depreciation of the original value, a norm is
used which is fixed by the government." See for details, D. S. Levin
and M. G. Polyakov, op. cit., pp. 24etseq.314 APPENDIX B
•but the regulating authorities pay no attention to these funda-
mental questions in fixing their rules.2° The enterprises may
make additional profits if the equipment lasts longer than its
assumed lifetime, or incur unexpected losses if the cumulated
quotas fail to provide them with the value of the outworn
plant.21 It is evident that the remedy of adopting "technologi-
cal" amortization quotas according to experience in capitalist
countries is a questionable one. A machine which lasts ten
years in this country may not be able to stand Russian treat-
ment for longer than five years.22 Great as this difficulty may
be, the method itself would not be open to as much criticism
20"Theobligatory inclusion of depreciation quotas in the calculation
of costs of output leads to an accumulation of an amortization fund
independently of the financial result of the activity of the given cor-
poration." V. G. Dolgov, Analiz Godovogo otcheta i balansa khoziastven-
nych organisatsii (Analysis of Annual Reports and Balance Sheets of
Business Enterprises, Moscow, p. 23.
21"Sincethe question of correctness of the amortization quotas is of
importance, as these quotas strongly influence the cost figures they
have to be revised regularly. It is necessary to examine whether they
really correspond to the effective wear and tear and, in cases of large
deviations, the reasons for these disproportions have to be clarified."
V. G. Dolgov, op. cit. Another author puts the question more strongly:
"The acting norms of amortization are not revised and are calculated
very often in accordance with foreign price lists. They do not corre-
spond to a smaller or larger extent with the real technical wear and
tear of the means of production. That is particularly true when they are
taken over from accounting materials supplied by capitalist enterprises
without being properly qualified and without due regard for the par-
ticular reasons for certain depreciation practice applied abrpad. Our
legislation adopting these high amortization quotas had in view the
possibility of capital accumulation necessary not only for reproduction
of the equipment in its original for its reconstruction
on a higher technical level. Such a viewpoint demands an increase of
amortization quotas which have to finance the construction of new
enterprises not only after the old ones are worn out, but much earlier
than that, because of the higher rentability of more modern installments
•.. Thatmakes our solution of the amortization question rather a
matter of definition agreed upon between economic authorities." A. I.
Rothstein, Problemy prornyshfennoi statiski v SSSR (Leningrad, 1936),
pp.288etseq. This book, which seems to be by far the best in this field
in Russian literature, should be consulted on all questions connected with
the problem at hand.
22Agriculturaltractors serve in Russia at most io,ooo work hours, and
need three general repairs, whereas in this country their term of service
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as the principle of exclusive regard for original values. To base
depreciation calculations on these values (which in addition
are corrected for changes in the "price level" and represent
deflated figures of very doubtful accuracy) is to give a com-
pletely distorted cost picture which includes considerable
amounts of outlay that are entirely unrelated to amortization.
The Russian economists realize this quite well, but maintain
that the procedure is rational by pointing to the necessity of
capital accumulation. But even though the necessity exists, it
is entirely inadmissible to work in additional profits and earn-
ings under the heading of costs (first element of pricing) after
profits, taxes, etc. (second element) have been accounted for
separately.
Since the worn-out plant can usually be rebuilt at consider-
ably lower cost than was incurred in the construction of the
original one,23 and since technical progress makes possible the
introduction of better and more productive machines and
tools, the system of calculating depreciation on the basis of
original values obviously deprives the planning authority of
correct information about the costs of producing a unit of out-
put, and makes virtually impossible a valid comparison between
different techniques of production. Cost figures which arc re-
garded as low (in comparison with other enterprises) may in
reality be very high, and include vast amounts of hidden prof-
its; high cost figures may lead to an erroneous impression of
real scarcity conditions, as their magnitude may be determined
by overvaluation of an old plant. These mistakes might be
corrected by the consumer if by shifting his demand from the
"too expensive" goods to the "cheaper" ones he could force
the authority to impute the resulting market price to the capi-
tal goods and thus revaluate plant and equipment. But as
under Russian conditions the better part of the demand is
not consumer's demand, but demand originating within the
four walls of the planning board, the problem can be solved
only by "trial and error," by a very conscious application
of the tdtonnementmethod,and by careful imputation of
23This statement, however, must be qualified in the case of the
Soviet Union. Insofar as imported machines or parts of machines are
necessary for the renewal of the plant, and foreign exchange is scarce,
the tenewal, in terms of Russian evaluations, may be more expensive
than the original plant—depending on the given situation of the Russian
balance of payments.316 APPENDIX B
the value (however estimated) of the finished product to the
value of capital goods. Since the entire capital accumulation
is controlled by the central authority and technical innova-
tions are directed according to its decisions, this practice would
by no means exclude the possibility of sponsoring investment
in industries which incur losses. It would, however, make it
feasible to calculate how much this "protection" costs in
terms of alternative uses. But it is precisely this application
of cost calculation that the methods employed in Russia ex-
clude. It is therefore entirely impossible to conclude whether
the amount of waste is minimized, whether the desired aims
are reached with the employment of the least investment
of resources, or whether mobilization of the available re-
sources could furnish better results. Once again the scarcity
prevailing throughout the country (particularly as measured
by the yardstick of governmental goals) precludes a proper
appraisal of the adopted techniques. Since this scarcity is par-
ticularly marked with regard to capital goods, and since labor
is cheap, all labor-saving devices have to break through the
wall of adverse profitabilities. Even without taking account
of interest on capital, which does not exist in Russia except
for short term money and governmental loans, the expensive-
ness of capital goods, the extremely high valuation of machines
and tools imported from aboard (they are still necessary for
many new installations) tend to make tbe average total costs
of a unit of output in new plants higher than in the old ones.
Nevertheless they coexist; the most up-to-date plants working
with heavy accounting losses are kept running alongside the old
prewar establishments making high profits. The only progressive
equilibration of this abnormal state of affairs is, in the opinion
of the government, accelerated accumulation of capital, an in-
dependence of "expensive" foreign supplies, and an increase in
the productivity of labor.
4.
As Max Weber once remarked, historical materialism is not
a horse-cab from which the passenger may alight whenever he
pleases. The strong interdependence of the degree of develop-
ment of Produktivkräfte and the corresponding Produktions-
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The endeavor to impose upon a backward, agricultural coun-
try a highly organized, precisely functioning and thoroughly
calculated economic system must necessarily involve stupen-
dous losses in life and goods. No country can neglect with
impunity the law of comparative costs; nor can it enforce
a saving of over 50 percent of the national income without
inflicting privation and suffering upon its population. This is
particularly true if the productivity of labor (as Cohn Clark
demonstrated strikingly in his illuminating Conditions of Eco-
nomic Progress) is as low as it is in Russia. Even if the time
preference of the Russian population were not converted into
its negative, but were allowed to underlie all the economic
activities of the country, the nation would still live on a low
level of income as compared with the industrially advanced
countries of the world. All the details of planning technique,
taken for what they are worth, are of secondary importance
in the light of these basic facts. Many things could be done
better, commodities that are needed could be produced and
conveyed to the consumer, goods regarded as "necessary," but
which pile up on the shelves of the shops, could remain un-
manufactured.Yet all these improvements, important as they
are, cannot decide the fate of the experiment. One of the most
brilliant economists in the Communist Party, the late E. Prto-
brazhenski, remarked: "...inour country where the central-
ized planned economy of the proletariat has been established
and the law of value has been limited or replaced by the plan-
fling principle, foresight and knowledge play an exceptional
role as compared with the capitalist economy. Errors in fore-
sight committed by our central leadership may have much
heavier consequences than errors committed by managers of
private enterprises where mistakes in one direction are often
cancelled out by mistakes in the opposite direction according to
the law of great numbers." 24 These words were prophetic. The
mistakes and errors of the "central leadership". have been nu-
merous. Its unwillingness to make use of advanced economic
science, its• undiscriminating adoration of the machine, its
power to disregard the consumer as an economic as well as a
political "voter"—may be only aspects of the backwardness of
the country. But it is wrong to say that, "It is the ability to solve
24E. Preobrazhenski, Novala Ekonomika (New Economics, Moscow,
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in a lasting manner these various price problems rather than
any technological accomplishments that will afford the test
of the adequacy and feasibility of the Soviet program of eco-
nomic expansion." 25Rather,the extent to which the system
will be able to eliminate scarcity and to raise the productivity
of labor will finally determine the success or the failure of
the entire undertaking.
The economic theory of socialism is just as useless in mat-
ters of economic policy under a planned economy as the theory
of pure competition is in capitalist countries. Free competition
is incompatible with large scale enterprise. Economic liberalism
is impossible in a world of monopolies, oligopolies and im-
perialism. Rational socialist planning cannot coexist with pov-
erty, with armaments, with autarchy, with "primary accumula-
tion of capital." Formal questions of planning are inseparable
from the material content of the planning.
The study of the economic policy of Russia, of the ways and
means employed by Soviet planners, is thus not a study of so-
cialist economics. Whether it is the study of failure to con-
struct a socialist society in a single backward country, or the
study of an early stage of socialist economics of the future
may be left to the decision of history. It is, however, neces-
sary and valuable. It can supply us with information as to how
successes can be achieved (even if they could be reached in
othercountries,under more favorableconditions, more
cheaply, with less sacrifices, less waste, less irrationality). It
can provide us, moreover, with some indispensable knowledge
of how mistakes and disasters can be avoided.






FEW branches of industrial practice are subject to greater con-
fusion than that concerned with the replacement of durable
assets.It is therefore appropriate, in a report on cost-price
relations, to examine the principles of correct practice and
survey customary- procedures. Some of the difficulties result
from ex parte preparation of estimates. Frequently both the
suggestion and the cost estimates for replacing a machine come
from a prospective salesman for the new machine.' Although
the more reliable tool-makers 2 value the goodwill of the manu-
facturer too highly to sell him a machine which they have no
reason to believe is economical, the ex parte position of the
estimator is not conducive to the most objective study of re-
placement problems.
Not many firms have any adequate method of determining
when the possibility of replacement should be explored. If
direct or indirect costs of production move out of line, a
budget may set the management looking for possible ways
of reducing costs, but no budget in itself can show when a
'Thetermmachine will be used throughout this appendix to denote
any depreciable asset. In addition to machinery itself this usage will
thus include such assets as buildings, production layouts, and process
patents.
2 term includes construction companies, production engineers,
etc. In this connection it is interesting to note the published advice of
H. K. Ferguson, head of a large building construction firm, in an article
in Factory Maintenance and Management (Vol.No.pp. 42-45)
entitled "To Build or Not to Build." He repeatedly states that no firm
should build if it can reasonably avoid building by simplifying the line,
rearranging departments, leasing space, etc. Further, "itis never safe
to build when more than half the cost of land and buildings must be
borrowed." Finally, "no business should build itself into such a position
that, because of heavy expenditures for plant and equipment itis
impossible to... breakeven or better during the next depression on
50 percent of production volume."
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machine is approaching the point of obsolescence. No auto-
matic procedure will reveal the answer even to the simpler
question of when to replace a machine with an identical ma-
chine which will have lower operating and maintenance costs.
It would appear that usual practice is to maintain a machine
until some person, master mechanic, foreman, superintendent
or salesman, has a "hunch" that it might be well to replace it.
Estimates are then made of the saving that could be effected,
and if this amount is sufficient to "pay for the machine" in
"a short period" the change is instituted.
The most casual examination of the files of a journal dealing
with the problems of production executives (such as Factory
Management and Maintenance) will convince the reader that
this sort of procedure is unsatisfactory. Consider such a sim-
ple matter as the alteration of a low power factor. Unlike most
wasteful practices, the existence of this "leak" is presented to
business executives every month if the electric utility has
the usual penalty clause for a low power factor. Yet over a
period of about ten years, at least three or four articles or
notes appear each year telling of the phenomenal savings some
company has achieved by installing capacitors or synchronous
motors. The technique for making the saving was well known,
and it had been shown applicable to almost any plant using
electric motor driven machinery. Nevertheless,.a large number
of firms postponed making any investigation of the possible
savings for years,3 when the usudi experience was to find sav-
ings "paying for" capacitors in a very short time.
,.TheAge of Depreciable Assets in Use
Itis not possible to obtain an accurate picture of the age
distribution of all machines in use, but the available data indi-
cate that a very large proportion of the machinery that was
functioning in 1939wasso old that its continued use was un-
likely to be economical. Mere age, of course, is no evidence
that a machine should be retired. Some types of machine may
still be economical after fifty years of service; others may be
obsolete after two or three years. Furthermore, the use made
of the machine by different plants will influence the time of
Replacement could conceivably havebeenpostponed because of lack
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obsolescence markedly. A thirty-year-old freight car may be
quite economical for meeting a short peak demand but ex-
cessively costly for Continuous use. These variations between
types of machine and usage are further complicated by the
different "life experiences" of apparently identical units. WTith
so many factors to be considered, any over-all examination of
age of machines must not be understood to indicate the amount
of obsolete machinery but rather to suggest the range of issues
involved in the problem of replacement.
The most generalized approach to this problem is the study
of the durable goods inventory as a whole. Terborgh has
pointed out that the durable goods inventory comprises more
than half of the total national wealth in the United States and
more than three fourths of the wealth exclusive of land and
natural resources. He estimates further that this inventory
contains ten to fifteen years' consumption at the current rate.
Since 1930 the age distribution of the goods in this inventory
has altered markedly. Apparently there were in 1939 a greater
number of durable goods than ten years previously, but the
amount of service life remaining in these goods was on the
average enough less to give the total inventory the same pros-
pective stock of services.4 Only a portion of the large stock
of durable goods consists of instruments of production (and
thus bears on the general problem of cost-price relationships).
Of the estimated 360 billion dollars expended for durable goods
during the twenty years from 1919 to 1938 only about37 per-
cent went into producers' plant and equipment.5
Turning from the over-all picture, which shows that "the
gap between the average quality and condition of durable
goods in use and the best that current technology affords is
much wider than before the depression" 6 to the case of
specific durable goods, we get a more definite impression of
over-age machines.
In 1925 only 44 percent of machine tools in use were more
than ten yearsold;in 1930 this percentage had risen to 48; in
1935 it was 65; and by the proportion had risen to 70
"Present Position of the Durable Goods Inventory," George Ter-
borgh, Federal Reserve Bulletin (October 1940), p. 1041.
Compiled from George Terborgh, "Estimated Expendinires for
Durable Goods," Federal Reserve Bulletin (September 1939), p. 731.
8 George Terborgh, 'Present Position of the Durable Goods Inven-
tory," bc. cit., p. 1043.324 APPENDIX C
percent.7 The situation with respect to railway equipment is
even more striking, and here the trend toward increasing
amounts of old equipment is of even longer standing. In 1930
20 percent of railroad locomotives were less than ten years of
age—a "normal condition" only if locomotives have a fifty-year
life. By 1940 the proportion had shrunk to 6 percent 8—a "nor-
mal condition" only with a locomotive life of one hundred
and sixty-seven years!
The age distribution of freight cars falls within narrower
bounds than that of locomotives, as is evident from the follow-
ing table:






































Jan. I, 1940 1,636,191 100.00
American Railway Car InstituteBulletin, Statisticsof Car Building and Car
Repairing (1939).
Thisstudy by the American Railway Car Institute reveals that
less than one seventh of the railway freight cars are less than
ten years of age while three sevenths are between ten and
twenty years old. Stated in another way, this means that half
a million fewer railway freight cars were purchased during the
1930's than during the 1920's. It is shown also that the replace-
ment rate in the 1920's was roughly equal to that of previous
years. The virtual absence of replacement in the early 1930'S
was a result of the loss in railway traffic, and the replacements
"HowIndustry, Labor and Government Can Help America," Factory
Management and Maintenance, Vol. 98, No. 8 (August 1940), p. A3i.
8Terborgh, bc. cit., p. 1042.DEPRECIABLE ASSETS 325
of wereonly half of normal. With increasing traffic
the railroads must face the problem of determining whether
it is cheaper to buy new cars or to run the old cars in the face
of increasing repair costs. Since almost a quarter of the cars
are over twenty-five years of age, the replacement problem
is of major concern to the railroads; it seems probable that cars
of this age are seldom economical for anything but peak loads
or special services.9
When the effects of a secular decline in use are combined
with the effects of cyclical depression the replacement of
durable goods may be very seriously curtailed. This was the
case with freight cars and is also the case with steam engines.
Two thirds of the steam engines in use in 1940 were over
twenty years old.'° The maximum "life" for steam engines
commonly accepted in the calculation of depreciationis
twenty-five years.1' Where technological advance is not only
rapid but also of considerable magnitude, the situation is less
striking in terms of age of machines than in terms of the propor-
tion of machinery which could be replaced economically.
Under such circumstances it is even more important that sys-
tematic and periodic studies of the possibility of replacement
be made if profits are to be maximized.
2.Stepsin the Replacement Problem
There are three phases of the replacement problem: (,)to
determine whether any given machine should be replaced by
9Any study of the age distribution of assets must take into account
the fact that the lives of individual assets of the same kind vary just as
the lives of human beings. Robley Winfrey in a monograph entitled
"Statistical Analyses of Industrial Property Retirements" (Bulletin 125,
IowaEngineering Experiment Station) presents retirement and survivor
curves for 176 different sets of data. An example of the extreme spread
of life is seen in three groups of small distribution transformers used
by midwestern power companies (curves 145,147,149).Onegroup of
zi6 had an average life of g.8 years with the maximum life of any
individual iyears.A second group of x 16 transformers with an aver-
age life of 11.0 years had a maximum of 23.5 years. An asset which
would appear to be highly standardized but which had a wide life
range is a sample of 939 cast-iron electric car wheels used by the Mil-
waukee Electric Railway and Light Company (curve 3 i).Theaverage
life was 30,500 car miles and the maximum 82,500 car miles.
10 Management and Maintenance (August 1940), p. A32.
11See W. A. Paton, Accountants' Handbook (Ronald Press, 1932).326 APPENDIX C
some one of a number of other given machines (or the service the
machine renders purchased as such), (2)todetermine the pos-
sible alternatives to the continued use of any given asset, and
todetermine when such studies of depreciable assets are
needed. It can readily be seen that these questions must be
answered in reverse order. Sometimes the need for studying
the replacement of an asset is thrust upon the management by
the breakdown of the machine, but such occurrences cannot
be made the basis of a system of replacement. This problem
of knowing when to study replacement possibilities can be
solved arbitrarily by a rule that every asset shall be studied,
say, oijce a year. Robert M. Gaylord, president of the Ingersoll
Milling Machine. Company, recommends a periodic check on
equipment for replacement possibilities. Few firms have any
systematic policy with respect to periodic checking for the
possibility of replacement.12 His company, producing machine
tools, had been selling its machines on the basis of economy
studies for years, but not until 1927didthe management con-
sciously shift from a replacement policy of "Will it run?" to
"Can it be done cheaper or better?" At this time the company
adopted a policy of checking on every machine at the end of
ten years. The difficulty with any arbitrary period for exami-
nation is that in some cases it will be much too frequent and
in others not nearly often enough. Since there is considerable
expense involved in making estimates, some balance must be
struck between the cost of making more frequent examinations
and the savings that can be achieved in this way. While some
firms may habitually replace assets too soon, it is doubtful if
any finn spends too much money in exploring the possibilities
of replacing present assets.13
The problem of determining the possible alternatives is al-
most as difficult and as badly handled in practice as the whole
subject of knowing when to study replacement possibilities.
It is the responsibility of the engineering staff to know all the
methods whereby the stream of services rendered by the asset
can be obtained. The search for these possibilities requires at
'2Robert M. Gaylord, "When to Buy New Equipment," Factory
and Industrial Management (July pp. 272-74.
'3Thisexploration of possibilities of replacement with presendy known
assets must not be confused with research and development work to
discover new techniques.DEPRECIABLE ASSETS 327
times a high order of imagination, bordering on the realm of
discovery. For instance, Grant 14citesa town which in pur-
chasing an old gravity feed-water supply employed an engineer
who failed to imagine the possibility of pumping water from
wells. Three or four years later the state Board of Health sug-
gested this possibility.
When the management has decided to make a study of re-
placement possibilities and the engineering staff has determined
the alternatives, the central problem of estimating whether or
not it will pay to purchase new assets can be approached. The
economist's answer to the problem is outlined in Chapter
The approach of the next section of this appendix will be that
of the businessman or engineer.15
3. When Is It Profitable to Replace a Machine?
A sufficiently accurate answer to this question, when the re-
placements being considered are deemed to have about equal
life, can be obtained by way of the three following questions: 16
(i)What annual savings can be expected from using the nrn-
chine at the expected level of output? (2)Whatwill be the
annual charge necessary to insure recovery of investment
within the minimum expected life of the machine due to cessa-
tion of demand, obsolescence or wear and tear? Doesthe
profit, if any, remaining after subtraction of the charge for
recovery of investment from the expected annual savings rep-
resent the most profitable way open, or likely to be open, for
use of the capital involved? To answer these questions may not
be as simple as would appear at first glance.'7
Eugene L. Grant, Principles of Engineering Economy, revised edi-
tion (Ronald Press, 1938),pp.235-36.
15ibid., Chs. XIV and XV, outlines a system basically similar to that de-
scribed in Chapter VIII of this report.
16 This simplified procedure follows that proposed by Gaylord, op.
cit., pp. 272-73.
17 These criteria are for competitive conditions and require some
modification when applied to monopoly. In the case of unregulated
monopoly, whether complete or partial, the question is not really any
different except insofar as a fear of regulation or competition prevents
profits from appearing too high. In the case of regulated monopoly, one
of the costs to be considered is the change in rate base. J. M. Clark
in his Studies in the Economics of Overhead Costs (University of Chi-
cago Press, 1923),pointsout that this reduction of rate base deters public
utilities from replacing obsolete equipment.r
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To determine the annual savings it is necessary to estimate
only those costs which will be altered by the use of the new
machine. For instance, there is no reason to assume that in-
direct labor cost will be decreased by the installation of a new
machine which uses less direct labor simply because there is
in operation a cost system which allocates indirect labor cost
on the basis of direct labor cost. Similarly, no reduction of
floor space charge should be made unless the freed space can
be utilized to average advantage. When the problem is ap-
proached in this manner, it is obvious that there is no reason
to be concerned about the book value of the replaced asset;
the costs associated with this asset have been incurred and no
action taken now will alter them. While it is true that under
competition a firm cannot continue in business if it repeatedly
fails to make sufficient provision for retiring its assets, it is
doomed to failure even more rapidly if, having made unwise
decisions about the purchase and depreciation of assets, it re-
fuses to replace assets whose operation entails out-of-pocket
costs higher than the total costs of new assets that render the
same services. Since the problem is to determine the costs that
will be altered, sunk costs cannot, by very definition, be con-
sidered. It is important, further, to bear in mind the limitation
entailed by the fact that savings must be realized not at ca-
pacity output but at the expected level. Finally, no charge is
to be made in computing the savings on account of deprecia-
tion or interest on the new investment, but any decline in
salvage value of the old asset should be reckoned as a cost of
continuing the use of that asset.
To estimate the service life of the investment requires even
more careful judgment than to estimate savings. It is unfortu-
nate that this entire question is ignored by the usual methods
of replacement study. A common practice is to lay down a
rule that an investment must "pay for itself" in a certain period
of time, say two years. A study of replacement policies showed
that the average period during which an asset had to pay for
itself was about three years.18 Apparently the meaning usually
attached to the dictum that "a machine must pay for itself in
two years" is that the savings during each of the first two years
must be 50 percent of the cost of the machine. If a profit rate
of 20 percent is expected, this means that the life of the ma-
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chine is arbitrarily set atyears. If the "pay out" time is
raised to three years, a profit rate of 20 percent yields a life
ofyears, which is certainly not excessive for a conservative
estimate in view of the rate of obsolescence today. Probably
when "pay out" periods of five years or over are used the
profit rate isfirst subtracted from the savings; we are then
speaking of a concept very close to that of our "estimated
life."
Since replacement studies are infrequently made on the basis
of careful estimates of probable life,itisdifficult to tell
whether the third criterion (do the savings represent the most
profitable use of the capital involved?) is given adequate con-
sideration. Most concerns which are large and progressive
enough to be considering a number of alternative types of in-
vestment in order to cut cost are probably able to borrow to
carry out any changes that show good prospects of profit.
In this case the criterion should be: will it yield a certain rate
of return.? This seems to be the idea of E. M. Richards, chief
industrial engineer of Republic Steel, who says that in a choice
between alternatives the criterion should be the rate of saving
on the added investment of the more costly process.19
The type of examination outlined above, which has been
put forward as a practical one by some progressive business-
men, has much to commend it. The freedom from highly tech-
nical considerations of present worth and interest rates should
appeal to business executives. Its presentation of a rate of profit
after provision has been made for capital recovery should em-
phasize the possibilities in any given investment.
19 Buy or Not to Buy Equipment," E. M. Richards, Factory
Management and Maintemmce, Vol. 91 (December 1933), p. 499. His
six points outline a method very similar to the one suggested above,
except for his somewhat modified criterion of choice. He sets a three-
year pay-out as proper for normal times and one year for depression





THE following classification of book paper products was pre-
pared by Albert Sawyer of the New York law firm of Wise,
Corlett and Canfield, in connection with a study of the rela-
tion of realized and quoted prices. The book paper industry
is one among about fifteen branches of the paper industry,
and as such represents a considerable degree of specialization.
How much farther specification of paper products can be
carried is indicated in this classification. Since there are 40
product classes, 12 grades, 33 finishes, 9 sizes and trims, 8 col-
ors, 8 quantity classes, and 19 types of packing, a meticulous
specification of product would distinguish between 170 and
iSo million possible products in the book paper industry.
Product Classes
Adding machine and cash register paper
Bank stock







































Papers in the above grades containing more than 25percent
ground wood and less than 35 percent bleached suiphite are
in the "ground wood paper" division. Papers above these limits




































Tub or surface sized
Special or fancy (unclass.)






































Rolls lbs. or heavier
250 Ibs.—5oo lbs.
Less than 250 lbs.
Less than 6" in width and 9" in diameter
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Bundlesflat with or without cardboard protection
skeleton frames
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THIS report is subject to two limitations, one set by the man-
date of the Committee and the other -by the method of presen-
tation adopted by the Committee. It seems to me that both of
these limitations may lead to confusion, or help to continue
confusion, in the minds of those who use the report—as many
doubtless will—as a manual or guide to empirical studies of
costs. A word of caution, here, may help to avoid such con-
fusion and therefore help to make this admirable and con-
structive study even more useful.
i. The mandate of the Committee (see Preface) requires a
behavioristic approach—that is, a study of the influence of
costs on price decisions. This is, of course, a great improvement
over the speculative or introspective method of imputing eco-
nomic motivation. The result is, however, that the Committee
is obliged to take as its data costs as these are conceived and
recorded in current business practice. But the elements in-
cluded in accountants' costs lit neither those of the economic
theory of costs nor those of the theory of productivity. In fact
they fit no better than the last two fit each other.
a. The theory of costs deals only with real costs—that is,
factors made available—though these are convertible into terms
of payment for factors and therefore into money costs.
b. The theory of productivity deals only with factors actu-
ally used, though again these are convertible into terms of
payment and therefore into money costs.
c. Accounting deals only with contractual and imposed costs
in terms of money.
The details of the differences in these three approaches
were given in Technical Paper 2(NationalBureau of Eco-
nomic Research, 1941) and American Economic Review,
(1941), p. andit is not necessary to repeat them here.
Suffice it to say that the category of costs for each of these
purposes excludes or includes certain elements which another
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includes or excludes. Except as these differences are recon-
ciled or allowed for, neither form of present theory can be
applied without qualification to current accounting data, nor
can conclusions from empirical studies of such accounting data
be used without qualification to modify either form of theory.
Until that is done the scientific utility of empirical studies in
this field will be very limited.
d. In another respect there is a difficulty in the use of
present theory in such studies. As I have shown in the paper
cited above, the theoretical device called marginal cost theory
is inconsistent with both the theory of costs (factors made
available) and the theory of productivity (factors used) inso-
far as the marginal costs to be considered are limited to what
the accountants call direct or "out-of-pocket" costs as against
overhead (i.e. to variable as opposed to fixed costs). So-called
variable costs exclude the returns on several factors which are
made available and even those on some factors actually used.
Nor is the device applicable in practice—except in a limited
number of particular situations where more or less of the ele-
ments of cost are disregarded (see my paper cited above)—
unless it is confined to use with reference to additions to a
current output which is already covering all contractual and
imposed costs. Thus any assumption that marginal costs, as
usually defined, are or should be generally determining of price
policies can only interfere with the attainment of successful
results from empirical cost studies.
2.Theother limitation is the consequence of the Commit-
tee's choice of approach, which treats the subject from the
angle of the several causes of change in costs as these have
been analyzed in past theory. These causes are:
Short run
a. Changes in rate of output.
b. Changes in prices of input factors.
c. Changes in technique.
Long run
d. Changes in size of plants and firms.
1?Vhen the actual accounting data are dealt with I am of the
opinion that it will not be found possible to distinguish the
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largely due to the fact that some of these rubrics are not pure;
they consist of mixtures which have not been adequately
analyzed. It will also be partly due to the fact that some of
these rubrics have been contaminated with a purely mystical
supposition—the law of the proportioning of factors and its
inference and basis, the declining marginal efficiency of each
factor as its proportion is increased.
In the short run:
a. Changes in rate of output, with given and uniform tech-
nique and given prices of input factors, cannot change costs
in terms of factors actually used. To the extent that costs are
figured instead in terms of factors made available, the effect
of changes in rate of output will depend wholly on the decision
whether to allocate such costs one way or the other. This de-
cision is necessarily an arbitrary or conventional one. If the
decision is to allocate such costs only to the product upon
which the factors are actually used, increased output will show
an increase in such costs per unit. If the decision is to allocate
such costs regardless of use, increased output will show a de-
crease in such costs per unit (see my paper cited above).
Other changes in costs as a result of changes in rate of output
are only apparently, not actually, due to this cause. That is,
they are either due to the use of more or of less efficient
machinery, etc., already installed (i.e., changes of technique)
or to more or less efficient labor, etc., at the same price (i.e.,
changes in prices Qf input factors).
•b. Changes in prices of input factors are only causative with
relation to prices insofar as they do not result in changes of
technique (for instance, only when labor cost changes to the
same degree as wages). All other effects may be said to be
induced by price changes of input factors, but what is actually
induced is a change in technique. In such cases the induced
change in technique is itself equally a causative factor on price
decisions. Sometimes it works in the opposite direction from
that of the change in price of input factors (i.e., compensa-
tory). Sometimes it works in the same direction (i.e., substitu-
tive). Thus rises in labor costs may induce better machinery
(technique). But declines in machinery costs may also induce
better machinery (technique).
Changes in technique properly include any changes in real
input-output relations. It is impossible to define technique in344 DIRECTOR'S COMMENT
any narrower way if the various types of input are, as is
necessary, classified by their kind and quantity of effect, not
by their prices, and if output is measured in terms of an un-
changed product. The committee recognizes this broad defini-
tion in the first paragraph of Section i,ChapterVII. Then,
in the following paragraph, an attempt is made arbitrarily to
exclude those changes in technique which are induced by
changes in price of input factors and those differences in tech-
nique which are due to changes in rate or differences in scale
of production. There the constraining effect of theory appears.
These effects are not separable from, and in fact are measured
by, the change or difference in technique only.
It is also to be noted that the presupposition of short run
analysis, that the plant remains unchanged, excludes all changes
of technique other than changes from one to another technique
already installed (i.e., changes in parts of plant used or in kinds
of men hired or materials bought). Installations of new tech-
niques are treated, in theory, as long run phenomena. The fact
that both long and short run changes in cost are largely due
to this one cause, changes in technique, does not, however,
vitiate the value of separate studies of the two runs. For the
potential variability of technique, and therefore the effect on
price decisions, is obviously different in the two cases.
In the long run:
d. Changes or differences in size of plants and firms seem
to me not to be, of themselves, causative of differences in cost.
Under the necessarily broad definition of technique, as given
above, and under the only possible definition of kinds and
quantities of input, there can bc no influences on prices, or
differences in costs, proceeding from differences in the size
of plants and firms other than differences in technique and in
prices of input factors. The difference in cost due to scale of
individual operations is either due to a difference in technique
—the use of a machine or a method (e.g., straight-line produc-
tion) which can be used economically only on a certain mini-
mum scale—or to more continuous use which is the same thing
as a change in the rate of output (seeabove). The difference
in cost due to scale of aggregate operations is either due to
differences in technique (organization) or to differences in
price of input factors (specialization, etc.).
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aprepossession, which crops up in this report, to the effect
that there is some other influence on costs besides the above.
This seems to be the idea that the marginal productivity of
any factor declines automatically as its proportion in the mix—
ture is increased. That, in my opinion, is purely imaginary.
There can be no change in proportioning of factors without a
change in technique. But changes in technique are specific,
definite and definable. Apparent changes in proportioning
require exploration until the actual change (in technique) is
found. There is room for no notion of continuous and auto-
matic fluxions in respect of the proportioning of factors, for
the changes consist solely of discontinuous and deliberate
steps.
The foregoing analysis leads to the supposition that, in the
course of their investigations, empiricists in this field are likely
to find that all influences on costs reduce to two, changes in
technique (including techniques with minimum economical
scale) and changes in the prices of input factors. To these. two
influences there may need to be added, for a behavioristic study
in our present institutional environment, one other influence. In
its theoretical aspect it is the effect of the decision as to the
actual method of allocation of the costs of factors made availa-
ble that are incurred while these factors are not in use. In its
practical effect on price making this is but part of a larger
question—the question as to the extent to which management
must consider its contractual and imposed obligations for pay-
ment to factors not used or to nonfactors (not properly costs)
and the extent to which it can ignore (and fail in) payment
to factors used (properly costs). (Spatial relations to markets
[transportation costs, etc.] are, of course, another influence on
costs by themselves. But this influence is unrelated to those
considered and is a separate field of study.)
So far as the influence of the two other apparent causes
of changes or differences in cost is concerned, it would seem
that the correct statement would be something like the follow-
ing:
i.Changesin rate of operation permit differences in cost
provided they enable or prevent the use of already installed
techniques requiring a minimum scale of ecpnornical opera-
tion, or providing they enable or prevent economies in the
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differences in costs for factors actually used result from
changes in the rate of operation.
2.Differencesin the size of plant or firm permit differences
in cost provided they enable or prevent the use of actually
available techniques requiring a minimum scale of economical
operation, or providing they enable or prevent economies in
the price of factors. In the absence of these two elastic elements
no differences in costs for factors actually used result from
differences in size of plant or firm.
If my tentative predictions turn out to be correct, attribut-
ing causation to other and secondary influences will merely haye
caused confusion and hunting of nonexistent causes will have
resulted only in a waste of time. However, the proof of the
predictions may require such a waste of time, though not so
much if the investigators recognize in advance the possibility
of the nonexistence of one of these theoretical causes, the
possibly secondary character of two others and the certainly
arbitrary, variable and institutional, character of allocation.
In my judgment, and for these reasons, only as the two
limitations described are taken account of and adjusted for
will it be possible to approach the Committee's very desirable
goal of a "coordination of empirical studies and theoretical
analysis."